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This capstone project created a proof-of-concept, web-based geospatial interface to 
record first-person written combat narratives from U.S. military service members in a 
story map format. The application compares the service members’ geographic-referenced 
combat stories, called story maps, against the historical record with the intent to validate 
potentially beneficial aspects derived from service member storytelling. If the stories 
produce results that are consistent or comparable to other historical records, then one 
consequence might be that soldier and Marine narratives may constitute an under-
explored reservoir of knowledge, observations, and data. 
The application accomplishes the project’s original three goals: recording 
multiple narratives; turning the multiple narratives into a comprehensive map; and 
allowing an analyst to compare and contrast the narratives with historical documentation. 
The second battle of Fallujah in 2004 is this report’s case study for testing the 
application. Using constructed stories from artificial authors, the application’s narratives 
produced equivalent graphic illustrations as compared to the historical maps from the 
battle of Fallujah. The geographic accuracy of the graphic illustrations, on a par with the 
historical maps, validated the concept of obtaining service members’ combat stories. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this capstone project is to develop a proof-of-concept, web-based 
geospatial interactive interface to obtain first-person written combat narratives from 
military veterans and/or active duty personnel. This project will compare a 
comprehensive Combat Stories map with historical documents that ultimately might 
validate the importance of storytelling.   
There are two overarching phases to this endeavor. The first phase involves 
designing the interface. There are three goals for this design:  creating an interface to 
record multiple narratives; portraying multiple narratives on a comprehensive map; and 
comparing and contrasting the comprehensive map with historical documents. The 
comprehensive map of multiple narratives is considered a story map, which is a way of 
organizing and presenting information using geography.1  A follow-on project (second 
phase) would gather actual narratives of a particular battle, employ the geospatial 
interface, and then analyze the comprehensive map of the battle by comparing it against 
available historical records.   
This project uses the second battle of Fallujah in 2004 as a case study. There are 
two main reasons for selecting the second battle of Fallujah. First, this battle is well 
documented in published books and articles. Since part of this capstone seeks to test the 
validity of the story map of collected narratives, the story map needs to be compared to 
the historical records, which are readily available. The second reason for selecting this 
battle is because of the broad range of associated narratives. While a U.S. Marine general 
commanded the battle for Fallujah, various units were involved with ground operations, 
including units from the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy. Due to the broad 
representation of services in this battle, this project has a higher likelihood of collecting 
                                                 
1 “What is a Story Map?” Environmental Systems Research Institute, accessed April 14, 2015, 
http://storymaps.arcgis.com/en/articles/what-is-a-story-map/. 
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multiple narratives discussing ground operations. The use of various services increases 
the ability to develop a more well-rounded story map from multiple perspectives. 
Before going any further, the meaning of narrative needs clarification. According 
to Merriam-Webster, a narrative is “a story that is told or written.”2  To narrow the focus 
further, this report uses award-winning author Samuel Hynes’ definition of personal 
narrative as “first-person writings in prose by participants in the events recorded.”3  In 
this context, the narrative will not be judged as to its accuracy. The narrative will be a 
compilation of multiple stories written by the service member who portray events from 
his or her unique perspective and memory. This capstone report considers narrative and 
storytelling synonymous.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This capstone report’s literature review has three main goals: to provide a brief 
history of written storytelling; to explain the importance of written storytelling; and to 
highlight the gaps within current Internet offerings that record combat narratives.  
1. The History of Written Stories 
The concept of communication through storytelling draws its roots from 
antiquity.4  The following three examples are some of the most famous written narratives 
in history. The oldest story ever written, recorded more than 4,000 years ago in the 
ancient city of Babylonia, is The Epic of Gilgamesh.5   While the story recounts multiple 
adventures by a legendary king, The Epic of Gilgamesh brings up issues of morality, 
creating civilizations, and eternal life. Over 1,200 years later, the Iliad and the Odyssey 
                                                 
2 Merriam-Webster OnLine, s.v. “narrative,” accessed February 23, 2015, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/narrative. 
3 Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War (New York: Penguin Books, 
1997), xiv. Hynes won a Robert F. Kennedy Book Award for The Soldiers’ Tale in 1998. 
4 Tanja Buttler and Stephan Lukosch, “On the Implications of Lessons Learned Use for Lessons 
Learned Content,” Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Knowledge Management and 
Knowledge Technologies (September 4–6, 2013, Graz, Austria), 2. 
5 David Damrosch, The Buried Book: The Loss and Recovery of the Great Epic of Gilgamesh (New 
York: Henry Holt, 2007), 240–246 and Morris Jastrow and Albert T. Clay, The Epic of Gilgamesh: An Old 
Babylonian Version (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1920), 11. 
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were recorded. Even though there is debate on when exactly they were written, since they 
were spoken first, the famous Greek poet Homer created the stories in the eighth century 
BCE.6  Homer’s purpose was to convey the events of the Trojan War and the experiences 
of Odysseus on his way home. The final example is the Hebrew Bible that is composed 
from Old Testament stories, which were written by the third century BCE.7  These 
various narratives convey the meaning of the foundations of the Jewish faith. 
In order to bring the history of storytelling into the twentieth century, let us look 
at four examples of the influence of personal narratives in the two world wars. In writing 
his dissertation in 1989 at Brown University, U.S. Air Force officer Thomas Bowie 
shows how the World War I Battle of the Somme is depicted by “an array of personal, 
historical, and literary narratives oriented around firsthand views of battle experience,” 
such as personal letters, journalistic dispatches, diaries, and epic poetry.8  Bowie 
accomplishes this depiction of the battle by a narrative matrix, which is “a web of 
narratives that individually and collectively seek to convey the overwhelming experience 
of a particular Great War battle.”9   
Moving from World War I to World War II, Anne Frank’s diary is one of the 
most powerful first-person perspectives of Jewish persecution during the Holocaust that 
gives insight and understanding into this affair.10 Personal narratives can take many 
forms such as memoirs, diaries, and journals. A diary is one form of a personal narrative 
that can give eye-witness accounts: author Iris Chang’s book provides first-hand accounts 
of the Nanking holocaust in World War II when the capital city of Nationalist China fell 
to the Japanese and seven weeks of “mass execution of soldiers and the slaughtering and 
raping of tens of thousands of civilians took place.”11 Chang relies on first-person 
                                                 
6 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, The World of Homer (Paris: Perrin, 2000), 19. 
7 John Riches, The Bible: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 37. 
8 Thomas G. Bowie, Jr., “An I for an Eye: Personal Narrative and the Great War” (PhD dissertation, 
Brown University, 1989), 47. 
9 Bowie, “An I for an Eye,” 47. 
10 Andy Alaszewski, Using Diaries for Social Research (London: SAGE, 2006), 17. 
11 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: Basic 
Books, 1997), XII. 
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narratives, such as the diary of John Rabe, a German businessman who sought to help the 
Nanking population, to depict this event.  The final example is from author, historian, and 
broadcaster Studs Terkel, who won the Pulitzer Prize for his work “The Good War”: An 
Oral History of World War II. Terkel collected first-person stories of over 100 various 
people’s experiences, which incalculably help the reader comprehend the World War II 
era.12   
2. The Importance of Narratives 
This project follows the premise that narratives hold meaning and importance. 
There are three main reasons for this premise: narratives can be a form of 
communication; narratives can be an alternate way to understand the past; and, narratives 
can help educate. The following section illustrates the scholarly validation for this 
premise.  
First, narratives are an important aspect to a culture’s communication. In 1983, 
William Kirkwood proposed that storytelling has more significance than mere religious 
connotation and can be thought of as a form of communication.13  According to 
Kirkwood, the importance of storytelling was relegated to mainly religious connotation, 
largely via parables. Since Kirkwood shared this perspective on storytelling, the scholarly 
arena of communication through narration has exploded.   
Walter R. Fisher first hinted at a second paradigm for human communication in 
1978.14  He did not formulate this theory until 1984 after reading Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory when Fisher took note that “man is in his actions 
and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.”15  Up until 
                                                 
12 Studs Terkel, “The Good War”: An Oral History of World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1984). 
13 William G. Kirkwood, “Storytelling and Self-Confrontation: Parables as Communication 
Strategies,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 69, no. 1 (February 1983): 59–60. 
14 Walter R. Fisher, “Toward a Logic of Good Reasons,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 64, no. 4 
(December 1978): 376 and 378. 
15 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981), 201. Walter R. Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of 
Public Moral Argument,” Communication Monographs 51 (March 1984): 1. 
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1984, the leading paradigm for human communication was the traditional rational 
paradigm. While Fisher acknowledges that earlier scholars began to identify the 
significance of alternate means of communication (i.e., political and legal 
communication),16 he proposed the theory of narrative paradigm as another 
interpretation to describe human communication. Fisher’s narrative paradigm proposes 
humans as homo narrans, or storytelling person, and he defines narration as “a theory of 
symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who 
live, create, or interpret them.”17 
In 1986, David Carr contributed to the narrative paradigm by stating “narrative is 
our primary (though not our only) way of organizing our experience of time, and 
understood in this sense it can elucidate our pre-theoretical past.”18  While Carr believes 
it is important to capture individual experiences, the clearest picture of an event evolves 
after gathering multiple individual perspectives and placing together for a group 
picture.19  This report concurs with Fisher and Carr that narratives are a form of 
communication and that multiple perspectives provide the clearest picture. This capstone 
project is not comparing and contrasting single narratives against historical documents; 
                                                 
16 Fisher refers to W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, Reconstruction Reality in the 
Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1981); W. Lance Bennett, “Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 8, no. 1 
(March 1975): 23–42; W. Lance Bennett, “Storytelling and Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Speech 64, no. 1 (February 1978): 1–22; Thomas B. Farrell, “The Tradition of 
Rhetoric and the Philosophy of Communication,” Communication 7 (1983): 151–180; W. B. Gallie, 
Philosophy and Historical Understanding (New York: Schocken Books, 1964); Leonard C. Hawes, “The 
Reflexivity of Communication Research,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 42 (1978): 12–20; 
Louis O. Mink, “Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument,” in The Writing of History, ed. R.H. Canary 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978): 129–149; Calvin O. Schrag, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, 
and Communication, Unpublished manuscript (Purdue University, Department of Philosophy, 1984); 
Robert L. Scott, “Evidence in Communication: We are such Stuff,” Western Journal of Speech 
Communication 42 (1978): 29–36; Herbert C. Simons, “In Praise of Muddleheaded Anecdotalism,” 
Western Journal of Speech Communication 42 (1978): 21–28. In Fisher’s follow up article “Clarifying the 
Narrative Paradigm,” Communication Monographs 56 (March 1989): 55–58, he additionally lists three 
previous books on narrative and communication: M. M. Baktin, The Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981); Frederic Jameson, The 
Political Unconscious: Narratives as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); 
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans Geoff Bennington and 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
17 Walter R. Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral 
Argument,” Communication Monographs 51 (March 1984): 1–2. 
18 David Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 4–5. 
19 Carr, Time, Narrative, and History, 5 and 122. 
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rather, the project’s goal is combining multiple individual narratives into a larger 
comprehensive story in order to compare this larger story with official or alternate 
historical battle narratives.  
The second reason why first-hand narratives are important is that they are another 
means to convey the past. History does not have to be elucidated purely from statistics. In 
1986, Martin Wallace commented, “Philosophers of history have shown that narration is 
not just an impressionistic substitute for reliable statistics but a method of understanding 
the past that has its own rationale.”20  Storytelling should not be relegated to only 
children’s bedtime stories or religious parables. Comparing the validity of compiled 
narratives into one comprehensive picture with historical documents can help show the 
importance, or lack thereof, of capturing individual narratives from combat battles. 
Last, narratives can serve to educate. In 1997, Gary Kenyon and William Randall 
stated that “to be a person is to have a story. More than that, it is to be a story.”21  Each 
person involved in a combat battle has his/her own perspective about what occurred. 
Phase two will be able to assess if these individual stories share more insight into a 
combat battle than what is represented in the historical documents. Robin Mello 
illustrates the essence and educational importance of storytelling by stating, “When we 
share narratives with others, insights and social knowledge evolve.”22  This project 
ultimately takes steps toward validating if service members’ narratives hold the essence 
of what historical records portray. It is also important to realize that stories serve to 
educate and understand something.23  Gathering a wider base of personal narratives from 
the battle of Fallujah may illuminate new lessons learned not previously documented.  
                                                 
20 Wallace Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 7. 
21 Gary M. Kenyon and William L. Randall, Restoring Our Lives: Personal Growth Through 
Autobiographical Reflection (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 1. 
22 Robin A. Mello, “Collocation Analysis: A Method for Conceptualizing and Understanding 
Narrative Data,” Qualitative Research 2, no. 2 (August 2002): 233. doi: 10.1177/146879410200200206. 
23 David Snowden, “Story Telling: An Old Skill in a New Context,” Business Information Review 16, 
no. 1 (March 1999): 32. 
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3. Gaps within Current Interfaces Available on the Internet 
The purpose of this capstone is to develop a geospatial interactive interface to 
obtain combat narratives. The two key aspects to this are combining multiple narratives 
into a comprehensive map and comparing the comprehensive map to a historical map.   
Currently, four main Internet sites offer web-based interactive maps to visualize 
written narratives. Additionally, three different sites have compiled multiple first-person 
veteran narratives, but these sites do not have a geospatial component. There are two 
overarching gaps among these seven sites. First, none has combined both multiple, first- 
person written narratives with a geospatial story map. Second, while these seven sites 
offer first-person narratives and geospatial story maps, none of these sites has attempted 
to compare a story map narrative with historical records. Below is a brief synopsis of 
each interface. 
Story Maps by ArcGIS Online: Jack and Laura Dangermond first founded 
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) in 1969 with the mission to evaluate 
geographic information for environmental decision planners.24  Today, ESRI supplies 
web-based Geographic Information System (GIS) software for interfaces. ESRI uses 
ArcGIS online to allow users to create Story Maps, which is the use of interactive maps 
to tell one’s story.25  One military-related story map created by ESRI is of the battle of 
Gettysburg.26 While the web-based geographic map does a good job portraying the 
decisive moments in the battle on a timeline, it does not allow the recording of personal 
narratives. Other than the Gettysburg battle, ESRI does not have any other story maps 
relating to military history. 
StoryMapJS:  Since 2013, Northwestern University’s Knight Lab has offered a 
website at no cost for users to tell a story from a geographic map.27  StoryMapJS also 
allows the user to connect photos, videos, additional historic maps, and other image files 
                                                 
24 “ESRI History,” Environmental Systems Research Institute, September 3, 2014, 
http://www.esri.com/about-esri/history. 
25 This website is located at http://storymaps.arcgis.com/en/ or http://www.arcgis.com/home/. 
26 This website is located at http://storymaps.esri.com/stories/2013/gettysburg/. 
27 This website is located at http://storymap.knightlab.com/. 
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to the map, in order to detail the timeline of the story. Currently, there are no historic 
military events captured on this site nor does this interface allow multiple users to 
collaborate on a single story map. Whoever creates the story map is the only one allowed 
to edit the story. Multiple narratives cannot overlay on one story map. 
Yale University’s Photogrammar Project:  From 1935 to 1945, the United 
States’ Farm Securities Administration and Office of War Information (FSA-OWI) 
officially documented over 170,000 photographs in response to both the Great 
Depression and World War II. In 2011, Lauren Tilton, Taylor Arnold, and Laura Wexler, 
two graduate students and one professor from Yale University, created an interface to 
link the digital files of the photographs, stored at the Library of Congress, with an 
interactive web-based map that allows users to gather data based on the visual 
representation of the map.28  Tilton gave an example that “a user will be able to quickly 
plot the percentage of military images collected by month and location or see a gallery of 
sharecropping images created in Georgia.”29  While the web-based map allows multiple 
users to gather data and share with one another, this site only concentrates on the 170,000 
photographs taken between 1935 and 1945.    
WebMapSolutions:  This company specializes in offering interfaces for creating 
story maps. While the company strives to help returning veterans, it is limited to creating 
a story map tracking ‘military recognition banners’ that honors a veteran with his or her 
picture on a banner hung from a lamp post throughout a particular city within the United 
States.30 
War-Stories:  This website began in 1995 with the intent of capturing personal 
stories from veterans from the Vietnam War.31  This website allows veterans to share 
their personal narrative as well as upload photos and other relevant information. While 
the site has collected more than 500 stories since inception, the website does not attempt 
                                                 
28 This website is located at http://photogrammar.yale.edu/. 
29 “Photogrammar Project Garners Support from NEH,” Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 
September 4, 2014, http://www.yale.edu/graduateschool/publications/news/201111/photogrammar-image-
database.html. 
30 This website is located at http://www.webmapsolutions.com/military-recognition-banners#more-’. 
31 This website is located at http://www.war-stories.com/warstory-5-author-title-az.htm. 
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to link stories to a geospatial map nor does it try to combine related stories to a particular 
battle or operation. 
Uncover “Her”story:  Women in Military Service for American Memorial 
Foundation, Inc., offers a web-based interface that allows a user to click on a particular 
state within the United States, which then opens a portal to multiple woman veterans who 
have served and shared their personal story.32  The site’s limitation is that the stories 
stored on the site are categorized on the map in relation to what U.S. state the veteran 
originated from; there is no link to the timeframe, war, operation or geographic region 
they served in. 
Veterans’ Stories from Around the State:  Texas Capital Vietnam Veterans 
Monument offers an interactive map that has compiled 90 stories from Texan Vietnam 
veterans and used an interface to link them according to their hometown within Texas.33  
Again, this site does not attempt to link the stories to the geographic location where each 
veteran served during the Vietnam War; as well as, the site is limited to Texan Vietnam 
veterans. 
C. CAPSTONE REPORT STRUCTURE 
This report begins by providing the historical background on the 2004 battles of 
Fallujah. In Chapter III, the interface features are described along with an example of 
how the results would appear for the comprehensive story map. In Chapter IV, the 
conclusion contains a summary, recommendations for further development, and 
suggestions for the second phase. 
  
                                                 
32 This website is located at http://www.womensmemorial.org/Membership/RegStateMap.html. 
33 This website is located at http://tcvvm.org/living-monument/interactive-map/. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE BATTLES OF 
FALLUJAH 
On March 31, 2004, four Blackwater USA security company contractors were 
ambushed by locals in Fallujah while escorting a two-vehicle convoy.34  Their bodies 
were mutilated, burned, dragged through the streets, and eventually hung from a bridge 
over the Euphrates River; this incident became known as the Blackwater bridge incident. 
Images were broadcast worldwide; a strong wave of reaction emerged in the United 
States. In order to capture the assailants, Operation Vigilant Resolve, now known as the 
first battle of Fallujah, began on April 4, 2004.35  Most Marines know about the spark 
that ignited the first battle of Fallujah. Even more Marines know that the failure to finish 
the first battle eventually led to the second battle seven months later. This chapter is a 
review of the two battles: an overview of the actual city of Fallujah; the conduct of the 
first battle; the al-Qa’ida leader who rose to power and ultimately caused the second 
battle; and the execution of the second battle. The intention of this chapter is to illustrate 
two of the historical maps that will form the validation baseline for the individual and 
comprehensive narratives. 
A. THE CITY OF FALLUJAH 
Fallujah is known as the City of Mosques for its nearly one hundred green-domed 
places of worship throughout the city.36  The main road that runs through the city of 
Fallujah is a key line of communication, linking Saudi Arabia with Turkey and Syria, as 
well as Syria and Jordan with Iran; accordingly, Fallujah naturally becomes “a way 
station for merchants, smugglers, and thieves crossing the desert.”37  Fallujah is located 
                                                 
34 Bill Ardolino, Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 162. 
35 Dick Camp, Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq (Minneapolis, 
MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 56 and 63. 
36 Vincent L. Foulk, The Battle for Fallujah: Occupation, Resistance and Stalemate in the War in Iraq  
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007), 4 and Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 16. 
37 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 11. 
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inside Iraq’s Sunni Triangle,38 which is dominated by an extremely close tribal structure. 
Due to the high degree of commitment to tribal life, Saddam Hussein “heavily recruited 
members of these clans and tribesmen into his elite Republican Guard and the Iraqi 
Intelligence Service (IIS) and provided them privileges to ensure at least some loyalty to 
his regime,” according to author Dick Camp, historian for the Battle of Fallujah.39   
In March 2003, a month after the invasion of Iraq, 1st Battalion, 325th U.S. 
Airborne Infantry Regiment entered Fallujah, setting up its headquarters on the main 
street in the heart of the city at a former Baath Party headquarters; 150 soldiers also set 
up at an abandoned school a few hundred yards south.40  A few days later on Saddam 
Hussein’s birthday, April 28, 2003, a crowd of approximately 250 people went to the 
school to protest the Americans’ presence. Soon after dark, several Iraqis fired their AK-
47s into the air as a sign of protest, yet the soldiers from the 82nd Airborne misinterpreted 
this as a threat, and in the confusion, the soldiers fired upon the crowd. Fifteen locals 
were killed, yet no Americans were injured, which Al Jazeera news station broadcast 
worldwide.41   
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by Ambassador L. Paul 
Bremer, issued two orders in May 2003 that disestablished the Baath Party and disbanded 
the Iraqi Army. Tensions quickly rose within the country, especially in the city of 
Fallujah, due to the high number of Iraqis formally employed by Saddam Hussein.42 This 
led to increased lawlessness, unemployment, and frustration within the city of Fallujah. A 
locally elected Shura Council regulated the city after Hussein’s removal in order to keep 
                                                 
38 While most Arab countries are predominately Sunni Muslims, Iraq is one of the few countries 
where Sunni Muslims are the minority of the population; roughly 20%. While Iraq’s majority population is 
Shi’a Muslims, the Sunni Muslims are the dominate majority within the Sunni Triangle, which is defined 
by roughly drawing a triangle around the south side past Baghdad, the west side near Ramadi and the north 
near Tikrit. Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2005), 194. 
39 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 13. 
40 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 17. 
41 Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam 
Books, 2005), 12 and Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 18. 
42 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 20. 
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order. While U.S. forces initially set up within the city, coalition forces were forced to 
maintain distance from outside the city by June 2003 due to insufficient personnel.43  
B. THE FIRST BATTLE OF FALLUJAH: OPERATION VIGILANT 
RESOLVE, APRIL 2004 
On March 24, 2004, I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), under the command 
of Lieutenant General James T. Conway, took over control of Fallujah from the 82nd 
Airborne.44  One week later, the famous Blackwater bridge incident occurred. General 
John P. Abizaid, U.S. Central Command commander, and Lieutenant General Ricardo S. 
Sanchez, commander of all  coalition forces in Iraq, recommended against an immediate 
offensive in Fallujah in response to the Blackwater incident. Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, disagreed with their assessment and took the plan to President George 
W. Bush, who approved the future operation named Operation Vigilant Resolve.45  
Two of the four objectives of Vigilant Resolve were to “eliminate Fallujah as a 
safe haven for Sunni insurgents; . . . [and] capture or kill the perpetrators of the 
Blackwater ambush.”46  Conway tasked his Ground Combat Element leader, Major 
General James N. Mattis, to plan the operation. The plan called for three Marine 
battalions, under the command and control of Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1), to 
cordon and then begin a sweep of the city. A cordon was set by 3 April while 2d 
Battalion, 2d Marines set up a blocking position on the southern edge of the city. The 
plan called for the two maneuver elements to sweep the city from opposite sides of the 
city with the intention to squeeze the insurgents into the middle.  2d Battalion, 1st 
Marines began from the northwestern corner of the city and focused south by southeast. 
At the same time, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines would begin from the southeastern corner of 
the city and focus northwest.47  Figure 1 shows the illustration of the plan: 
                                                 
43 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 20. 
44 Foulk, The Battle for Fallujah, 20. 
45 Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2008), 331–333 and Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 56. 
46 Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 332 and Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 63. 
47 Kenneth W. Estes, Into the Fray: U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: U.S. Marines in the Global War 
on Terrorism (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Division, 2011), 34–35. 
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Figure 1.  First Battle of Fallujah.48 
The assault on Fallujah began early morning on 6 April. On the same day, Mattis 
ordered an additional battalion from Regimental Combat Team 7 to join the battle.  3d 
Battalion, 4th Marines arrived on 7 April in the northeastern corner of the city and began 
sweeping westward. 
Soon after the onset of fighting, a media frenzy began. General Sanchez, 
commander of all Coalition forces, recounts: 
The fighting was house-to-house and door-to-door. It was fierce, bloody, 
and extraordinarily aggressive.  . . . Al-Jazeera’s television cameras and 
reporters showed up just at the right time to record major attacks against 
coalition forces . . . selective editing, and a reporter who consistently 
portrayed the side of the Sunnis incited resistance against the coalition.49   
                                                 
48 Estes, Into the Fray, 41. 
49 Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 348 and 352 
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Reporter Ralph Peters concurs with this perspective that “the Marines in Fallujah 
weren’t beaten by the terrorists and insurgents, who were being eliminated effectively 
and accurately. They were beaten by Al Jazeera. By lies.”50 
According to General Sanchez, the Bush administration felt the pressure of the 
upcoming June 30 transfer of authority from the CPA to the Iraqi interim government, as 
well as the U.S. November elections. On 9 April, only days after the commencement, 
Bremer met with Abizaid and Sanchez to tell them to cease offensive operations.51 
While I MEF was ordered to halt the assault, coalition forces still operated within 
the city from April 9–30. On May 1, 2004, I MEF withdrew all units from the city and 
conducted a transfer of authority to the Fallujah Brigade. Dick Camp’s investigative 
research into Operation Phantom Fury highlights that “Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyah 
provided extensive coverage of the insurgents’ version of the story. Fallujah became a 
symbol of resistance.”52  Even with the local Fallujah Brigade in charge, the situation 
grew worse as Fallujah became a safe haven for anti-coalition fighters. In Fallujah 
Awakens, author Bill Ardolino succinctly articulates:  
As the insurgency began to coalesce in and around Fallujah in 2004, it 
morphed from being comprised of mostly former Baathist military 
personnel to a conglomeration of groups led by one of Iraq’s most 
prominent nationalist and Sunni religious figures [Harith al-Dhari, the 
chair of the Association of Muslim Scholars]. In addition, a new 
component began to insert itself into Iraq, the foreign mujahidin. Dhari 
and other Sunni insurgents welcomed or tolerated these foreign fighters, 
including al Qaeda-affiliated radicals, as visiting allies.53 
Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi was one of the leaders of the foreign fighters invited into the city 
after April 2004, which ultimately led to the second Battle of Fallujah seven months later. 
                                                 
50 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 90. 
51 Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 354–355 and Estes, Into the Fray, 38. 
52 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 79. 
53 Ardolino, Fallujah Awakens, 162. 
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C. FALLUJAH BETWEEN THE TWO BATTLES: ABU MUS’AB AL 
ZARQAWI, MAY – OCTOBER 2004 
Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi was not the traditional al-Qa’ida leader in the sense that 
he was not a person from wealth like Usama bin Ladin, nor a person of education like 
Abdallah Azzam, nor a prolific writer like Abu Mus’ab al-Suri; yet, al-Zarqawi 
ultimately became al-Qa’ida’s senior representative in Iraq in October 2004 when he 
pledged his allegiance to bin Ladin.54  Al Zarqawi is one of al-Qa’ida’s leaders who had 
many different faces. This next section shows how al-Zarqawi became the future al-
Qa’ida leader in Iraq. Three main phases in al-Zarqawi’s life must be understood- when 
he was called (1) Ahmed Fadel al Khalaylah, (2) Abu Muhammad al Gharib, and (3) Abu 
Mus’ab al Zarqawi. 
1. Ahmed Fadel al Khalaylah 
In 1966, the notorious al Zarqawi of Fallujah was born under the name of Ahmed 
Fadel al Khalaylah in Zarqa, Jordan, a city a few miles northeast of Jordan’s capital.55  
Ahmed Fadel came from Bedouin heritage, the al Khalaylah clan of the Banu Hassan, 
which was an East Bank tribe loyal to Jordan’s Hashemite royal family. One of three 
brothers and seven sisters, Ahmed Fadel was extremely close to his father.   In 1984, 
Ahmed Fadel’s father died causing his family to drop to an even lower poverty status 
than when his father had been alive. After dropping out of school and embracing drinking 
and the low-level gang life, Ahmed Fadel was arrested for possession of drugs and sexual 
assault and eventually sentenced to prison in 1987.56 
As the Afghan-Soviet war began in the 1980s, the idea of the anti-Soviet jihad 
began to spread. As a graduate of the University of al Azhar in Islamic jurisprudence, 
Sheikh Abdallah Azzam taught at the University of Amman, Jordan from 1973–1980, 
                                                 
54 Jean-Pierre Milelli, “Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Jihad in ‘Mesopotamia,’” in Al Qaeda in its Own 
Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 248. 
55 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 29 and 260. 
56 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 31. 
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spreading revolutionary messages connected with the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan.57  
Upon arriving in Pakistan in 1984, Azzam founded the Maktab al Khadamat, the Arab-
Afghan Service Bureau, to organize the increased numbers of Arab fighters traveling to 
Afghanistan to embrace the anti-Soviet jihad.58  Upon release from prison in the late 
1980s, Ahmed Fadel began attending al Hussein Ben Ali Mosque in Zarqa that was loyal 
to Azzam from his time there in the 1970s and accordingly, continued to promote 
Azzam’s radical message. Soon after, a recruiter from the Arab-Afghan Bureau helped 
secure Ahmed Fadel’s transportation to the Afghan cause via a plane to Pakistan; Ahmed 
Fadel took the name of Abu Muhammad al Gharib, the Stranger.59 
2. Abu Muhammad al Gharib 
Soon after arriving in Pakistan in the spring 1989, al Gharib traveled to Khost but 
was too late to join the Afghanistan jihad due to the Soviet withdrawal in February 
1989.60  Sometime after 1991 in Peshawar, al Gharib met Issam Muhammad Taher al 
Barqawi, also known as Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, “a distinguished radical Salafi 
thinker,” who became one of two “main sources of authority for the Salafi jihadists 
ideology in Jordan, which established its stronghold in the city of Zarqa,” according to 
author Loretta Napoleoni.61  The ideology of Salafism is based upon: 
Muslims who . . . want to see the restoration of pure and pious religious 
practice, without the syncretism and impurities of later centuries. In short, 
they believe that Muslims have deviated from true Islam and that they 
need to be shown the errors of their current ways and to change for the 
“better.”62   
                                                 
57 Milelli, “Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Jihad in ‘Mesopotamia,’” 242. 
58 Thomas Hegghammer, “Abdallah Azzam, the Imam of Jihad,” in Al Qaeda in its Own Words, ed. 
Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 
92–93 and Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 34–35. 
59 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 39 and 42. 
60 Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, with Damien Martinez (New York: 
Other Press, 2005), 17 and Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 260. 
61 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 50. 
62 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
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Al Maqdisi introduced al Gharib to this ideology while in Peshawar.  According 
to Napoleoni, Al Gharib learned from al Maqdisi to “reject all those who do not believe 
in al Tawhid ideology, and to reject all those who do not join in condemning all tyrants, 
including Muslims and Arabs.”63  This became the baseline for al Zarqawi of Fallujah’s 
ideology. 
During 1993, both al Maqdisi and al Gharib traveled back to Zarqa, Jordan. Even 
though both were welcomed back as mujahedin, neither had participated in any battles in 
Afghanistan. Two events led both Salafist thinkers to adopt a more radical rhetoric in 
their messaging. On September 13, 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) signed the Oslo Peace Agreement and later on October 26, 1994, Israel and the 
Jordanian government also signed a peace agreement. Both al Maqdisi and al Gharib 
began to separate themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front, so 
they founded the al Tawhid group, later renamed Bayaat al Imam. Al Maqdisi and al 
Gharib focused on revolution jihad against the infidel regime because they felt the 
Jordanian government was practicing infidel policies by signing the peace agreement 
with Israel.64  Due to their radical message, al Gharib and al Maqdisi were arrested by the 
Jordanian secret service in March 1994, and both were sentenced to 15 years in al 
Suwaqah prison for creating an illegal jihadist organization and possessing explosives.65   
Prison was a transforming process for al Gharib. Whether it was the solitary 
confinement or torture, al Gharib harnessed his organizational leadership.66  During his 
time in prison, al Gharib grew out of the shadows of this mentor, al Maqdisi, and became 
emir of the al Tawhid group.   
After seven years in prison, the new king in Jordan, Abdallah II, granted general 
amnesty to thousands of prisoners, including al Gharib and al Maqdisi on March 29, 
                                                 
63 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 58. On page 55, Napoleoni lays out how Sayyed Qutb altered the 
meaning of al Tawhid in the 1950s to mean “God is the source of power, not the people, not the party 
neither any human being.” 
64 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 62–63. 
65 Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, 40–42. 
66 Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, 44 and Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 69 and 72. 
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1999.67  Only a few months later, al Gharib left for Hayatabad, Pakistan, with the intent 
to get involved in Chechnya. After an eight-day arrest for an expired passport, al Gharib 
was forced to go to Afghanistan, where the Taliban were in a struggle against the 
Northern Alliance. Al Gharib’s al Tawhid group held approximately 80–100 Salafists 
from Palestine and Jordan but remained far from the fighting in Lougar.68 
In the beginning of 2000, Usama bin Ladin, emir of al-Qa’ida, and al Gharib met 
in Kandahar; al Gharib was looking for funding for his group. A key takeaway from this 
meeting is al Gharib’s decision to decline the offer to join al-Qa’ida; al Gharib was not a 
believer in bin Ladin’s transnational jihad.69 
3. Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi 
After meeting with bin Ladin in 2000, Muhammad Makawi, known also as Seyf 
al Adl, director of al-Qa’ida’s military operations, recommended that al Gharib set up a 
training camp for his group.70 Gharib moved his group to Herat, very close to the Iranian 
border in northwest Afghanistan. There he changed his name to Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi. 
Mus’ab was one of the Prophet’s famous warriors (Musab Ibn Omayr), martyred in 625 
at the Battle of Uhud, and al Zarqawi means “from the city of Zarqa.”71  By support of 
the Taliban and increased recruitment, al Tawhid became known as Jund al Sham.72  In 
December 2001, Jund al Islam (Soldiers of Islam) combined with other jihadist groups to 
form Ansar al Islam (Partisans of Islam); the emir became Najm al-Din Faraj (aka Mullah 
Fateh Krekar) with Abd al Moneem Mustafa Halima (aka Abu Baseer) as the spiritual 
guide with the focus on local regimes, in this case Saddam Hussein.73  Accordingly, a 
logistical hub was set up in Bajra, Iraq. Soon after establishing the Herat camp, al 
                                                 
67 Milelli, “Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Jihad in ‘Mesopotamia,’” 243. 
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Zarqawi sent Abu Abdel Rahman Al-Shami (Ra’id Khuraysat) and three others to Iraqi 
Kurdistan.74 
After al Qa’ida’s attacks on September 11, 2001, the Coalition forces’ campaign 
in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001. Aligning with the Coalition forces, the 
Northern Alliance surrounded al Zarqawi’s training camp in Herat; this forced him to 
leave his camp and to lead a convoy of 400 vehicles to Kandahar, but he soon left the city 
after his ribs were injured when a rocket hit the house he was hiding in.75  Al Zarqawi 
then fled to Tora Bora where the majority of the Taliban and al Qa’ida forces were 
concentrated. After losing the battle at Tora Bora, al Zarqawi did not follow bin Ladin. 
Instead, he went to Pakistan, then to Zahdan, Iran, where he and his associates were 
hidden by Iranian Sunnis and then escorted to Teheran. In early 2002, the Iranian 
government shutdown al Zarqawi’s bases and captured twenty of his followers, which 
forced him to move into Iraqi Kurdistan where he established two military training 
camps.76  The Kurdish secret service knew al Zarqawi was in northern Iraq and informed 
the United States.77   
On February 5, 2003, al Zarqawi received worldwide recognition when U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell mentioned al Zarqawi in a speech to the U.N. Security 
Council: “Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Ladin and his al Qa’ida 
lieutenants.”78 Ansar al-Islam took heavy loses upwards to 180 Islamist fighters killed 
and 150 captured shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.79  In June 2003, 
Ansar al-Sunna (Partisans of the Sunna) merged under Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad 
(monotheism and Jihad) led by Zarqawi. It was not for another 17 months when al 
Zarqawi publically declared allegiance to bin Ladin and renamed his group Qaedat al-
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Jihad in Mesopotamia on October 19, 2004.80  The next section covers how the city of 
Fallujah catapulted al Zarqawi to the forefront of all the other competing jihadists. 
4. Al Zarqawi’s New Narrative and the Effect on Fallujah  
During the first battle of Fallujah, the Marines were directed to cease combat 
operations inside the city after four days, which did not allow them sufficient time to 
completely eradicate the insurgents and jihadists; this was seen as a victory for the 
insurgents. From May-October 2004, al-Zarqawi used Fallujah as a base of operations by 
harnessing the already present Salafi jihadists within the city. During this time, al-
Zarqawi broadened al-Qa’ida’s message to include brutal public beheadings and sectarian 
violence against Shi’a Muslims.  
One of the reasons al Zarqawi was able to garner so much publicity was his new 
tactic of public beheadings. Gory and grotesque, the Internet and media publicized these 
beheadings, which propelled al Zarqawi to the forefront in the jihadist community. On 
May 11, 2004, the world was introduced to this new brutal tactic in a video of Nicholas 
Berg, an American civilian; a website with links to Islamist extremist groups released a 
video of Berg beheaded personally by al Zarqawi with a long knife.81  Afterwards, al 
Zarqawi released a statement Recommendations to Jihad Fighters that stated Berg was 
murdered because of the United States’ inability to exchange prisoners held at Abu-
Ghraib.82  According to a 2006 Foreign Policy magazine article, prior to al Zarqawi’s 
death, al Qa’ida was responsible for five to ten percent of the attacks conducted in Iraq 
but still received a disproportionate amount of media attention.83    
The reason for al Zarqawi to resort to this brutal tactic might have been political. 
At the time of the first battle of Fallujah, there were up to six different jihadist groups 
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vying for power in Iraq.84 It was not clear who would be the dominate jihadist group. In 
addition, al Zarqawi did not officially make his allegiance to bin Ladin’s al Qa’ida until 
October 17, 2004.85  By June 2004, al Zarqawi’s release of Berg’s death video united 
these groups under Tawhid wal Jihad, which allowed him to rise to power in Iraq.    
While al Zarqawi and his group are reported to have comprised only a small 
percentage of the actual fighters in Fallujah from April to October 2004, al Zarqawi allied 
with key leaders within the city between the two battles. One was Omar Hadid, a local 
Salafist-jihadist, who was known to have shut down beauty parlors and music stores in 
the 1990s.86  Fallujah was one of the few cities that saw an increase in Salafists in the 
1990s, creating a solid foundation for al Zarqawi to leverage in 2004.87   Al Zarqawi and 
Hadid had a hidden torture chamber and video studio within Fallujah. In September 2004, 
two Lebanese men, Charbel Hajj and Aram Nalbandian, were captured at a checkpoint 
manned by Tawhid wal Jihad and interrogated for 27 days to determine if they were 
aiding the Americans. While in captivity, they were interrogated in a building where they 
heard screams on multiple days and even witnessed a murder of another Egyptian 
accused of helping the Americans.88 
While there were other hotspots throughout Iraq, Fallujah afforded a safe haven 
for the jihadists. Tawhid wal Jihad’s focus was the Sunni Triangle due to the high 
concentration support of Sunnis. They broke the Sunni Triangle down into nine areas of 
responsibility with Fallujah as the headquarters.89  In Jolan Park within Fallujah’s 
northwest district, this torture chamber and headquarters for al Zarqawi was discovered 
and destroyed during the second battle of Fallujah.90  No videos of beheadings were 
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released before the first battle of Fallujah; only when the insurgents and jihadists held 
control of the city were these videos released. From May to October 2004, Tawhid wal 
Jihad claimed responsibility for nine beheading-style executions, at least one per month, 
and more than 150 foreigners were kidnapped throughout the entire year.91 
Al Zarqawi’s second method of broadening al-Qa’ida’s message dealt with 
targeting Shi’a Muslims. On January 22, 2004, a letter was intercepted from al Zarqawi 
to bin Ladin that illustrated al Zarqawi’s desire to fold under al-Qa’ida.92  That same 
letter also underlines al Zarqawi’s strategy to target Shi’a:  
This is why I say again that the only solution is for us to strike the 
heretics, whether they are men of religion, soldiers, or others, until they 
submit to the Sunnis. You might object that it is too soon, and unfair to 
throw the nation into a battle for which it is unprepared; that this will 
cause losses and spill blood; but this is precisely what we want.93 
Fallujah gave al-Zarqawi the confidence to implement his strategy. Al Zarqawi 
accused Shi’a Muslims as apostates, al Takfir.94  On July 28, 2004, Abu Anas Al-Shami, 
al Zarqawi’s senior representative in Fallujah during the first battle, declared on the radio 
that, “If the infidels take Muslims as protectors, and these Muslims refuse to fight, it is 
permitted to kill these Muslims.”95 
One reason for al Zarqawi to undertake this new narrative may have been due to 
false assumptions. In the letter to bin Ladin and Zawahiri, al Zarqawi clearly stated one 
of his misbeliefs that, “They [Shi’a Muslims] know that, if a sectarian war was to take 
place, many in the [Islamic] nation would rise to defend the Sunnis in Iraq.”96   As 
                                                 
91 Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, 142. 
92 “If you make your plan and agree to the idea of fighting heretical sects, we will be your soldiers, 
standing ready. We will rally to your banner, obey you, and even pledge our allegiance to you, publicly and 
in the media”  Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, “Letter to bin Ladin and Zawahiri” as found in   Milelli, “Abu 
Musab Al-Zarqawi,” 267. 
93 Al Zarqawi, “Letter to bin Ladin and Zawahiri,” as found in Milelli, “Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,” 
264–265. 
94 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 56. 
95 Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, 135. 
96 Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, “February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority English translation of 
terrorist Musab al Zarqawi letter obtained by United States Government in Iraq,” U.S. Department of State, 
February 2004, accessed November 21, 2014, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm. 
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history has shown, the Muslim community did not condone the sectarian war in Iraq.   
This might have been the same reason why al Qa’ida took so long to accept al Zarqawi’s 
allegiance in December 2004.  
D. THE SECOND BATTLE OF FALLUJAH: OPERATION PHANTOM 
FURY / AL-FAJR, NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2004 
It was an Iraqi decision to execute the second assault on Fallujah. On June 24, 
2004, CPA authority was turned over to Ayad Allawi, the interim prime minister of the 
new Iraqi government.97  Also during late summer, Lieutenant General John F. Sattler 
took over for Conway as the commander of U.S. Marine forces in Iraq.98  Due to the 
events occurring within Fallujah over the past six months, Sattler recounts how it was 
Allawi’s decision to conduct the second battle of Fallujah: 
Allawi determined that Fallujah had to be cleared to keep from exporting 
terrorism. Thugs could come to the city; get their missions, ammunition 
and training; and move out to other parts of the country to execute their 
missions. The only way to stop those thugs was to clean them out.99 
By the beginning of September 2004, planning began for the assault upon 
Fallujah. Learning from their mistakes in the first battle of Fallujah, Coalition forces 
made new changes. In order to combat the anti-Coalition media campaign that was so 
successful in the first battle, Allawi shut down Al Jazeera’s Baghdad office to limit the 
insurgent’s information operations campaign.100 Sattler also decided to use a much larger 
force as compared to the first battle, which only used four battalions.   
Inevitably, the Fallujah Brigade disbanded by September 10, 2004 unable to 
secure the city. On October 14, 2004, peace talks fell apart due to the Fallujah 
leadership’s inability to meet the coalition’s demands to hand over al-Zarqawi and 
                                                 
97 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 117. 
98 Estes, Into the Fray, 54. 
99 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 119. 
100 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 119. 
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foreign fighters.101  Sattler set the commencement for November 7 and named the 
upcoming assault Operation Phantom Fury. 
Two days prior to the start, Prime Minister Allawi felt there was a better name for 
the operation since the current one had no meaning with the Iraqi people. Allawi 
recommended al-Fajr (new dawn) as a way to combat the insurgent Information 
Operations (IO) campaign under Remember Fallujah.102   
Operation Phantom Fury called for a massive north-to-south clearing operation 
that involved six U.S. maneuver battalions and an additional U.S. Army armored brigade 
and Marine battalion for blocking positions. The plan was broken down into two phases. 
The first phase involved the six battalions starting at the northern edge of the city and 
moving southward until reaching Highway 10, the main east-west running road. Major 
General Richard F. Natonski previously took over as Commander of the Marine GCE 
from Mattis on August 29, 2004, and was responsible for the execution of the battle.103  
Natonski assigned Regimental Combat Team 1 to command and control the three most 
western maneuver battalions, and Regimental Combat Team 7 to control the three eastern 
maneuver battalions. Each regimental combat team had two Marine Corps infantry 
battalions as well as a U.S. Army armored battalion.104  An additional U.S. Army 
armored brigade was assigned to blocking positions to the east and south sides of the city, 
and an additional reinforced Marine light armored reconnaissance battalion was assigned 
to blocking positions to the west of the city.   While there were nine U.S. Army and 
Marine battalions directly used in the operation, there were also six Iraqi battalions for a 
                                                 
101 Estes, Into the Fray, 181–182. 
102 Camp, Operation Phantom Fury, 153. 
103 Timothy S. McWilliams with Nicholas J. Schlosser, U.S. Marines in Battle: Fallujah, November – 
December 2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 2011), 5. 
104 McWilliams, U.S. Marines in Battle: Fallujah, 7 and 13. Regimental Combat Team 1 consisted of 
3d Battalion, 5th Marines; 3d Battalion, 1st Marines; and U.S. Army Task Force 2–7 (2d Battalion, 7th 
Cavalry). Regimental Combat Team 7 consisted of 1st Battalion, 8th Marines; 1st Battalion, 3d Marines; and 
U.S. Army Task Force 2–2 (2d Battalion, 2d Infantry). The southern and eastern blocking position 
consisted of 2d Brigade Combat Team (2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry), which included mechanized infantry 
battalion, designated Task Force 1–5 Infantry (1st Battalion, 5th Infantry), to the south and Task Force 1–5 
Cavalry (1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry) to the northeast. The blocking position to the west on the western side of 
the Euphrates river was Task Force Wolfpack, consisting of Company C, 3d Light Armored 
Reconnaissance Battalion; Company B, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines; and U.S. Army reinforced mechanized 
infantry Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry. 
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total of 12,000 ground troops involved with the actual assault.105  The first phase took 
place between 7–10 November. According to U.S. Marine Corps historical records, the 
map below depicts the first phase of the operation: 
 
Figure 2.  First Phase of the Second Battle of Fallujah.106 
  
                                                 
105 McWilliams, U.S. Marines in Battle: Fallujah, 8. 
106 McWilliams, U.S. Marines in Battle: Fallujah, 15. 
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During the second phase of the operation, one Marine maneuver battalion and one 
Army armor battalion from each regimental combat team continued the clearing 
operation from the main east-west running road southward to the edge of the city, while 
one Marine maneuver battalion from each regimental combat team would remain in their 
previous sectors and continue to back-clear. The second phase took place from 11 to 16 
November. According to the U.S. Marine Corps historical records, the map below depicts 
the second phase: 
 
Figure 3.  Second Phase of the Second Battle of Fallujah.107 
With most of the intense fighting completed by the end of the two phases, Allawi 
formally announced that citizens could return to the city on December 23, 2004.108  
                                                 
107 McWilliams, U.S. Marines in Battle: Fallujah, 40. 
108 Foulk, The Battle for Fallujah, 225. 
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Sattler remembers just how tough the battle was: “The fighting was intense, close, and 
personal, the likes of which has been experienced on just a few occasions since the battle 
of Hue City in the Vietnam War.”109 Out of the primary six U.S. assault battalions 
involved in the battle, there were 63 dead and over 500 wounded.110  The coalition 
captured 1,052 fighters and killed an estimated 1600.111  Fallujah was no longer a safe 
haven. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Even though Colin Powell specifically identified al Zarqawi as an insurgent 
leader in a U.N. speech on February 5, 2003, al Zarqawi had not yet solidified his 
leadership within the ranks of al Qa’ida. The United States’ inability to complete the first 
battle of Fallujah allowed al Zarqawi to establish a base of operations. In the city of 
Fallujah, al Zarqawi obtained unparalleled recognition by using new tactics of beheadings 
and secular violence during the period from May to October 2004. The Iraqi interim 
prime minister then recognized the situation in Fallujah could no longer be ignored. 
Using an overwhelmingly more aggressive and thoroughly planned operation, the second 
battle of Fallujah eradicated the city of the insurgents and foreign fighters. The two 
Marine Corps historic maps previously depicted in this chapter are those used in this 
capstone project to assess how similar or divergent the collection of individual soldier 
narratives are in comparison to the historic maps. 
                                                 
109 John F. Sattler and Daniel H. Wilson, “Operation AL FAJR: The Battle of Fallujah-Part II,” 
Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 7 (July 2005): 12–24. 
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III. COMBAT STORIES INTERFACE APPLICATION 
This capstone project created an application from ESRI software that is designed 
to be both powerful and simple.112  The application is intended for use on a desktop or 
laptop computer using the JavaScript programming language, which allows the user to 
access the application from most web browsers.113  While the application and 
geodatabase physically reside on a Naval Postgraduate School server, the application can 
be accessed online through the Internet.114   There are four modes to the interface: Tell 
Your Story; View Stories; Validate Mode 1; and Validate Mode 2. In this context, a mode 
is considered a different page of the application that has a unique purpose. The first two 
modes of the application are designed for all users to access; authors can enter their 
narratives as well as access the View Stories mode to explore other narratives after they 
have entered their own. The last two modes of the application are designed to be accessed 
by analysts only. The following sections describe the attributes of the four modes and 
explain how the validation and analysis is performed for the final two modes. 
A. THE VALIDATION PROCESS 
This project compares combat stories with historical records that ultimately may 
validate potentially beneficial aspects derived from service member storytelling. 
                                                 
112 Powerful and simple is one of the user-interface and interactive design guidelines defined by Jeff 
Johnson, Designing with the Mind in Mind: Simple Guide to Understanding User Interface Design Rules 
(Boston, MA: Morgan Kaufmann, 2010), xii. 
113 David Flanagan, JavaScript: The Definitive Guide, 5th ed. (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, 
2006), xv and 1–3. While the application is designed for desktop or laptop computers, the application can 
be deployed to mobile devices without significant development requirements. This project did not 
incorporate the use of the application on a mobile device since the essence of the application is to capture 
and record a user’s written narrative. It is expected the user will type more than 300 words for each event in 
their narrative for a particular battle; a desktop or laptop computer is best suited for this. For inputting 
narratives, Google Chrome is the preferred Internet browser. 
114 The narratives are stored on a geodatabase, which is “a database or file structure used primarily to 
store, query, and manipulate spatial data. Geodatabases store geometry, a spatial reference system, 
attributes, and behavioral rules for data. Various types of geographic datasets can be collected within a 
geodatabase, including feature classes, attribute tables, raster datasets, network datasets, topologies, and 
many others.”  Michael Law and Amy Collins, Getting to Know ArcGIS for Desktop, 3rd ed. (Redlands, 
CA: Esri Press, 2013), 729. This project’s geodatabase contains two main feature classes; one contains the 
first event of each author’s narrative and the second feature class contains the remaining events in a 
narrative. 
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Validation is “the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation and 
its associated data are an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of 
the intended uses of the model.”115  In this context, the model is the graphic 
representation of the author’s narrative.   
This project does not intend to validate the accuracy of the narrative but rather the 
potential importance of service member storytelling. An appropriate method to validate 
storytelling could be the Comparison to Other Models method, which is when “various 
results (e.g., outputs) of the simulation model being validated are compared to results of 
other (valid) models.”116  Using this Comparison to Other Models method, service 
member storytelling would be validated if the majority of the narratives with similar 
events in the same time period and location achieve resemblance to published historical 
accounts.  
In addition to the Comparison to Other Models method, a complementary 
validation method is to use the Face Validation method, which is “an informal validation 
method wherein expert observers subjectively compare simulation results with their 
knowledge of the behavior of the actual simuland.117  Differences between the simulation 
results and the experts’ expectations may indicate model accuracy issues.”118   Using the 
Face Validation method, the analyst would be the expert observer, who uses his or her 
military knowledge of the battle of Fallujah, comparing the service members’ narratives 
with the historical map in order to validate storytelling. The following section describes 
                                                 
115 Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), DOD Modeling and Simulation Verification, Validation, and 
Accreditation. DOD Instruction 5000.61. Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 
December 9, 2009, 10. The instruction defines a model as “a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical 
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process.  (Non-comprehensive examples: a 
mathematical formula, a mock-up, a logically rigorous representation of a system or a systems behavior, 
and a human behavior representation).” 
116 Robert G. Sargent, “Verification and Validation of Simulation Models,” paper presented at 2007 
Winter Simulation Conference, Washington, DC, December 2007, 128. 
117 Simuland is “the real-world system of interest. It is the object, process, or phenomenon to be 
simulated.”  Mikel D. Petty, “Verification and Validation,” in Principles of Modeling and Simulation: A 
Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. John A. Sokolowski and Catherine M. Banks (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc., 2009): 122. 
118 Petty, “Verification and Validation,” 142.    
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the first step in the validation process: recording a written combat story using the Combat 
Stories application. 
B. MODE ONE: TELL YOUR STORY 
The Tell Your Story mode is the page that records the individual narratives with 
the understanding that one author’s narrative might consist of multiple stories or events. 
After loading the application, the user will automatically begin in the Tell Your Story 
mode. The user begins at this mode so that he or she does not have the opportunity to 
read any previously recorded narratives; the goal is to stimulate a narrative from an 
author that is unaffected by reading other narratives concerning the same battle. Figure 4 
depicts a splash screen prompt that first appears on the page to give initial guidance and 
directions to the user, which highlights the application’s ability to record multiple, 
different stories or events in a single narrative. Also illustrated in Figure 4, there are no 
other stories displayed on the greyed-out map on the right hand side of the screen. The 
only option is to click on the “Create New Narrative” button. 
 




Figure 5 illustrates that once the user clicks on the “Create New Narrative,” a 
form appears, which allows the user to either type in biographical information or use a 
drop down menu to select battle-specific attributes. Once the button “Save Narrative 
Details” is selected, the user will begin adding story events to his or her narrative. 
 
Figure 5.  The green box identifies biographical information and battle-specific 




Figure 6 displays how the user can immediately designate the location of the 
story’s first event by clicking on the map. The user is able to zoom into a specific 
location at street level by either using the + / - symbol in the top right hand corner of the 
map or using the scroll button on the mouse. The user can then enter the date, time, and 
story of the event that occurred at this location. The user will then be able to classify this 
event by selecting the involvement type. The user clicks on “Save Point” when he or she 
is ready to tell the next story at the next event location. The user will then start adding the 
next event by date, time, story, and involvement type. The user can add as many story 
event locations to the narrative as he or she wishes. When the user is done adding all the 
story events to their narrative, he or she clicks “Finished” to save, and the narrative page 
resets. 
 
Figure 6.  The green box identifies the “Create a new story point” dialogue box 
as it appears to the user.  The green circle identifies the point on the 





Figure 7 shows a drop-down menu at the top left hand corner of the application 
that allows the user to move between one of the four pages in the application. Selecting 
one of the four drop-down options will change the viewer modes. 
 
Figure 7.  Switching Between Modes: The green box depicts how to switch 





C. MODE TWO: VIEW STORIES 
The View Stories mode allows the user to view submitted narratives. As depicted 
in Figure 8, the user can narrow the scope of his or her research interest in a particular 
narrative by filtering by battle, unit, and time. Yellow square symbols represent various 
combat narratives in the database. In this mode, the application only displays the starting 
points for all narratives, not the particular event or events in a single narrative; the map 
displays the number of authors, not the total number of stories within all narratives.119   
 
Figure 8.  View Stories Mode: The green boxes illustrate how the application 
can filter the map by battle, unit, and/or time. 
While in the View Stories mode, the user is able to view the individual events that 
make up a particular narrative. After zooming into a certain geographic location, the 
individual narratives are indicated by single yellow square pin-drops. These yellow 
squares are the first event locations for each author. Figure 9 depicts that once a user 
clicks on a yellow square, all other stories appear for that single narrative and are 
represented with yellow circles. The user is then able to scan and/or select through the 
                                                 
119 This capstone project narrowed the case study to the second battle of Fallujah. However, the 
application is designed to accept narratives pertaining to a host of battles. Figure 8 is displaying contrived 
narratives from different battles throughout the world. 
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different events and read each combat story. Figure 9 shows that there are three 
additional events and stories after the user selected the initial narrative. 
 
Figure 9.  View Stories Mode: The green circles depict the multiple events in 
one narrative that appear after a user clicks on a yellow square. The 
green box illustrates the pop-up dialogue box that appears once a user 
clicks on a yellow circle.  
The next step in validating storytelling is to compare and contrast the combat stories with 
historical records; the next section describes how the Combat Stories application helps 
the analyst conduct the comparison using a geoprocessing model. 
D. THE GEOPROCESSING MODEL 
A geoprocessing model is “an interconnected set of processes, with each process 
consisting of input data, a tool, and output data, which can be fed into another 
process.”120  In order to perform the GIS analysis for the two validate modes, a 
geoprocessing model is used. Figure 10 is a graphic depiction of the geoprocessing model 
used for this application. The dark blue circle is the input data set, in this case the 
database of narratives. The light blue circle is the model parameter, which is what the 
                                                 







analyst sees when opting to run the model; this prompts the analyst to enter the total 
number of days to analyze (i.e., the duration of the battle). The yellow boxes are the 
actual geoprocessing tools that perform the analysis, and the green circles are the data 
output from those tools. The remaining objects are model remnants, which are values, 
processes, or datasets that are used only within the database for geoprocessing 
operations.  
 
Figure 10.  The ArcGIS Narrative Validation Model is used for the validation. 
In the case of the Narrative Validation Model, the data is processed by five 
different tools that perform specific tasks. The first is the Grouping Analysis tool that 
combines the narratives into groups by date. These groups are then processed by two 
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additional tools:  the Standard Distance tool calculates the distance each event occurred 
from other events; and the Maximum Bounding Geometry tool draws a polygon around 
each group of events. In Figure 11, Example A is a depiction of the resulting polygon 
from the geographic extent of the events in that group/period of time.  
 
Figure 11.  Implementing the Narrative Validation Model: Example A is a 
resulting polygon from a group of events in the same period of time. 
Example B is a line showing each individual’s chronological account of 
the battle. Example C is a red triangle, which is the geographic center of 
a polygon. Example D is a line linking the red triangles, which is the 
geographic mean path. 
 The fourth tool is the Points to Line, which draws a line between the events in 
one author’s narrative. In Figure 11, Example B illustrates the resulting line that shows 
each individual’s chronological account of the battle. The final tool is the Mean Center, 
which calculates the geographic center of the events grouped together based on time; this 
results in the red triangles as depicted in Figure 11, Example C. These points are then 
processed through the Points to Line tool, resulting in a visual representation of the 
geographic mean path for the events. Figure 11, Example D is a demonstration of the 
geographic mean path. The next two sections describe how the final two modes of the 
application use the Narrative Validation Model in order to finalize the validation process.  
 
Example  B 
Example  C 
Example  A 
Example  D 
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E. MODE THREE: VALIDATE MODE 1 
The Validate Mode 1 view allows analysts to compare individual narratives with 
historical records. Initially, this mode presents all the narrative events on the main map. 
Two drop-down filters allow the analyst to select a specific battle and unit, down to the 
battalion level. After selecting these two filters, the historical map is displayed over the 
basemap at a reduced transparency. In the Fallujah case study example, once the user 
selects the second battle of Fallujah, the analyst is able to choose between the battle’s 
first and second phases; this allows the analyst to conduct a more thorough examination.    
An analyst may use distance as one comparison technique. The analyst can 
visually compare an individual narrative to how close or far in distance the narrative 
event locations are in relation to the historical map. The transparent bold blue lines from 
the historical map illustrate the generic movements of the various battalions. In Figure 
12, all events by a single author comprise a narrative that is linked in sequence by lines. 
The various authors are differentiated from one another by color.  [Note: the lines do not 
delineate the actual path of the author; the lines are displayed to help the analyst’s eye 
distinguish one author’s narrative from another.] While in this mode, if the analyst 
identifies an event from a narrative that appears to diverge from the historical map, the 
analyst is able to click on that event and read the story. 
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Figure 12.  Validate Mode 1 View: The yellow circles represent the individual 
stories and events. The different colored lines differentiate the various 
authors. The green box depicts how an event can be selected and read.  
F. MODE FOUR: VALIDATE MODE 2 
The Validate Mode 2 affords the analyst the opportunity to compare and contrast 
the narratives from a different visual aspect. In this mode, the analyst uses time and 
proximity as comparison techniques. The analyst can compare an event written by one 
author against the versions of other authors in the same battalion during a similar event 
time. In this mode, all events are divided into groups based upon the date the event 
occurred; these groups then have a polygon transposed around their points. Visually, one 
would expect the events from authors in the same battalion to occur approximately within 
the same time and location. This mode helps the analyst visualize distance proximity by 
using a transparent colored polygon to group events associated by time from all the 
battalion’s authors.121   
                                                 
121 There might be a potential problem if the service members do not recall the exact dates of their 
battle experience. In that case, the Narrative Validation Model can be adjusted to include a geographic 
gathering tool that would group similar events from a battalion’s battle based upon location and distance to 
one another.   
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Figure 13, Example A depicts how a typical time polygon appears. A small 
polygon means that the events were close in distance to one another and in the same 
relative timeframe. On the other hand, if one author’s event varies drastically in time or 
location compared to the other authors’, the polygon will depict more variance in size as 
demonstrated in Figure 13, Example B. The shape of the polygon can also give an 
indication of the type of variance that is occurring. Since the analyst knows the intended 
movement of the battalion, he or she knows the direction in which events should progress 
over time. For example, the events depicted in Figure 13 should proceed in a southwardly 
direction. An elongated polygon to the south will show that some events occurred ahead 
of the rest, depicting either an error or an advanced unit possibly performing 
reconnaissance. 
 
Figure 13.  Validate Mode 2 View: Example A is a polygon with low variance 
among stories;  Example B is a polygon with high variance. The green 
arrow depicts the “outlier” story as compared to the other teal-colored 
grouped stories, which causes the elongated polygon. 
Validate Mode 2 also has a second feature. This mode combines all the battalion’s 
narratives from a specific battle into a single visual display. The application takes the 
aggregated mean of the grouped events and pinpoints that location on the map with a 
 Example  A 
Example  B 
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small red triangle icon. To help the analyst visually see the progression of the aggregated 
mean locations, black and white dotted lines link the points; the lines do not actually 
indicate the aggregated mean path. In Figure 14, the four red triangles represent the 
contrived narratives from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines’ authors over 24-hour time segments; 
these points are overlaid on top of the historical map from the first phase of the battle of 
Fallujah. In this contrived scenario, the comprehensive narratives’ mean locations 
compare very closely to the historical account.  
 
Figure 14.  Validate Mode 2 illustrates a battalion’s comprehensive narrative. 
The red triangles indicate the aggregated mean center of the grouped 
stories, while the black-and-white dotted lines link the triangles 
according to chronology.  
G. IMPLICATIONS FROM THE VALIDATION 
If soldier and Marine storytelling is validated by the processes previously 
described, there are several positive implications: (1) future researchers can conduct 
original investigations, (2) current military leaders can obtain better lessons learned, and 
(3) the geodatabase can act as a repository of knowledge.   
 43 
1. Future researchers on a particular battle can conduct original investigations:  
First-person perspectives from a particular battle are only available as long as the 
survivors are still living. Once all the veterans from a battle have passed, future 
researchers will have to rely on already written accounts from past researchers and 
historians, who had the opportunity to record the first-person perspective. Future research 
then becomes based on second and third person perspectives, which have already 
conducted a level of synthesizing. This application is a means to use the database as a 
repository of first-person narratives for future research. 
2. Current military leaders can garner lessons learned from a broader range of 
perspectives:  In today’s U.S. military, after a combat patrol or battle has occurred, the 
senior person is responsible for informally submitting an after-action report that captures 
the main details of what occurred. While effort is taken to depict all perspectives from 
those involved, ultimately the after-action report reflects the senior person’s perspective. 
If there is a discrepancy between multiple perspectives on certain events within the battle, 
the majority’s view endures or the perspective of the senior person present. This 
application gives every person involved in a battle the opportunity to record his or her 
perspective for future leaders to glean lessons learned. 
3. The geodatabase can act as a repository of knowledge: The geodatabase can 
help give insight into topics such as measuring the level of skill among individuals and 
units by using first-person narratives. Professor, author, and historian Stephen Biddle is 
one person that has identified the need to conduct further study on the distribution of skill 
among units. In 1996, Stephen Biddle made an argument that there “are important 
discrepancies between the historical record and the existing explanation of the Coalition’s 
low loss rate” in the Gulf War.122   After research and analysis, Biddle systematically 
defends that the two leading theories are wrong. Biddle proposes “a synergistic 
                                                 
122 Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of 
Conflict,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996):  173. During the 1991 Gulf War, 795,000 Coalition 
troops shattered hundreds of thousands of Iraqi army soldiers in less than six weeks. The amazing part was 
not the small amount of time taken, but rather the extremely low number of friendly losses for such a 
kinetic war, only 240. Due to the low loss rate, the leading theory for the outcome of the war proposed it 
was due to the Coalition’s advanced technology. The second leading theory proposed that the result of the 
war was due to Iraqi deficiencies such as lower number of troops, poor training, or frail morale.   Biddle, 
“Victory Misunderstood,” 142 
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interaction between a major skill imbalance and new technology caused the radical 
outcome of 1991.”123  Specifically, Biddle’s reference to skill imbalance alludes to the 
Coalition’s offensive skill and the Iraqi’s defensive error. Biddle heavily drew his 
evidence for this theory from the 73 Easting Project.124 
 During the 73 Easting Project, extensive effort was taken to replicate the most 
accurate computer generated reenactment of the armored battle during the Gulf War 
along the 73 Easting by obtaining first-person stories from the battle. Biddle used the 
computer simulation program and the data from the 73 Easting Project to tweak certain 
parameters to prove his argument. While his theory is extremely convincing and accurate, 
there is an even greater lesson from his analysis that one might pass over without 
focusing on it. Biddle clearly highlights that  
The skills of national military organizations have not heretofore been the 
subject of systematic study. While anecdotal evaluations of individual 
armies have been compiled for generations, there have been few attempts 
to harness rigorous social scientific methods for the developments of a 
deeper or more general understanding of the causes or distribution of such 
skills.125   
Biddle was not only able to influence future force planning models focused on the 
revolution in military affairs; he was also able draw a direct correlation of a ‘nonlinear 
synergistic model’ between skill imbalance and new technology that caused the outcome. 
Biddle was able to do this based upon data from individual stories gathered during the 73 
Easting Project. This capstone application could be the foundation of a database that 
                                                 
123 Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood,” 140. 
124 The 73 Easting Project is a study done by the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the U.S. Army in order to collect data with the “purpose of 
creating an after-action battle replication.”   The project chose a battle between three troops from the 2nd 
U.S. Army Calvary Regiment and the Iraqi Republican Guard 18th Armored Brigade along the North-
South running longitude, 73 Easting, over a six hour period on 26 February 1991. The American forces 
consisted of 28 M-1A1 tanks and 37 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, while the Iraqi equipment consisted of 55 
T-72 tanks, 33 BMP-1 Armored Personnel Carriers, and 3 T-55 tanks. Even though the Iraqis had 41% 
more armored vehicles than the Americans, the heaviest fighting lasted 90 minutes and the results were 
definitive: the three American troops lost only two M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (one due to friendly fire), 
while the Iraqi Brigade lost 57 tanks and 28 BMPs.   W.M. Christenson and Robert A. Zirkle, 73 Easting 
Battle Replication, IDA P-2770 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1992), A-8, 2, and 11. 
125 Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood,” 178. 
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provides support for analyzing the distribution of skill and knowledge within a unit. 
Ultimately, this project could be a repository of under-explored data and knowledge. 
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This capstone project creates a proof-of-concept, web-based geospatial interactive 
interface to record first-person written combat narratives from U.S. military service 
members in a story map format. The application accomplishes the original three goals: 
recording multiple narratives; portraying the multiple narratives into a comprehensive 
map; and allowing an analyst to compare and contrast the narratives with historical 
documentation. This capstone explains the importance of storytelling and the historical 
context that led to the second battle of Fallujah, this report’s case study.  
The application has four modes: the first two modes allow the user to enter a 
narrative with multiple events and stories, as well as view and read all the narratives, 
while the last two modes allow the analyst to compare and contrast the narratives with the 
historical maps. Using contrived stories from artificial authors, the application’s multiple 
narratives achieved geographic parity to the historical maps from the battle of Fallujah; 
this similarity validated the importance of service members’ storytelling. The following 
two sections list six recommendations for further development of this application and 
suggestions for the second phase of the capstone project. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
The following six sections highlight recommendations to implement before the 
application operationalizes beyond the proof-of-concept stage. The current application is 
functioning as designed; conducting the second phase is not contingent on these 
additional recommended developments. The following recommendations will enhance 
the application and the user’s experience: 
1. Security / Access to the Application 
In order to access the application, the Naval Postgraduate School’s access 
manager to the ESRI site must first grant a user or analyst a username and password. 
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Figure 15 depicts how the user is automatically taken to a sign-in page, which requires a 
username and password, after the user types in the Internet address for the application.126 
 
Figure 15.  Sign-in page to access the Combat Stories application. 
The application was built under the context of a proof-of-concept, so a limited 
number of people have access to the application. In order to improve the security and 
launch the application beyond a proof-of-concept stage, it is recommended the 
application be modified to require access using the Department of Defense (DOD) 
Common Access Card (CAC). There are three benefits to this; first, the Naval 
Postgraduate School access manager for ESRI would not have to preapprove usernames 
and passwords. This would lessen the management requirement for the application, as 
well as speed up the processing time a user needs to wait to be granted access to the site. 
Second, the application could be modified on the Tell Your Story mode to auto-populate 
certain fields such as name, service, and point of contact information. Benefits of 
streamlining the gathering of this data would lessen the time a user has to spend filling in 
biographical information. Third, the accuracy and accountability of each narrative 
reported would increase. When a user logs-on to the application via the DOD CAC, the 
                                                 
126 This website is located at http://gaia.ern.nps.edu/npsviewer/da4500.html#. 
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user would be more likely to ensure his or her story is accurate since there is minimal 
chance of associating that narrative under a false identity. 
2. Narrative Review before Publishing on the Internet 
The application is designed as a proof-of-concept so all stories are automatically 
added to the geodatabase and immediately published on the application for other users to 
see and read. A mechanism needs to be put in place so stories are reviewed before they 
are published for all users to read. There should be oversight of any improper language 
and content of the stories. If the application is on an UNCLASSIFIED network, then the 
stories should not divulge any CLASSIFIED information. During the oversight 
management process, if a story is identified as breaching the security classification, the 
story would be flagged and dealt with appropriately before being published.  
3. Instruction Video Tutorial 
In order to clarify any possible questions a new user may have about creating a 
story map, it is recommended an instruction video tutorial be created and added to the 
splash screen. During the testing phase of the application, it is recommended a person 
knowledgeable about the application be physically present at the locations where users 
are inputting their narratives in order to answer any questions about how to create the 
story map or to use the application. Beyond the proof-of-concept stage, a user should be 
able to access the application from any computer that has access to the Internet. While the 
intent of the application design is for the application to be naturally intuitive for the 
author to use, the application can help explain to the user how to add his or her combat 
story by having a short video tutorial demonstrate an example. 
4. View Stories Mode Changes: Narrative Clustering  
On the View Stories mode, the starting points for all narratives are represented by 
yellow squares. At zoomed out elevations, multiple narratives in one location are 
displayed by a single yellow square, which does not allow the user to know if there is 
more than one narrative at that location. In order to accurately represent the data on the 
View Stories mode, the application should apply clustering, which “simplifies your data 
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visualization by consolidating data that are nearby each other on the map in an aggregate 
form.”127  Figure 16 is a graphic illustration of a map before clustering, and Figure 18 is 
a graphic illustration after clustering is applied.128  
 
Figure 16.      The image on the left is a map before clustering is applied, while 
the image on the right is a map after clustering is applied. The green 
circle depicts 31 authors in the Central American region. 
By applying clustering, the application portrays the narratives contained in the 
interface more accurately. Clustering is applied when two or more data points are within 
a certain distance of each other. If the user zooms into a lower elevation where the two 
points fall outside the distance parameters, then the clustering disappears and the 
individual points reappear. For example, in Figure 17, the clustered number 31 indicates 
that thirty one authors have written narratives in the Central American region. After 
zooming into a certain geographic location, the clustering of authors’ narratives 
disappears, and the individual narratives are indicated by single pin-drops. 
5. Tell Your Narrative Mode Improvements 
Five minor changes on the Tell Your Narrative mode will make the application 
more user friendly. First, after the author selects his or her service, the units available to 
                                                 
127 Luke Mahe and Chris Broadfoot, Google Geo APIs Team, “Too Many Markers!” Google, 
December 2010, https://developers.google.com/maps/articles/toomanymarkers. 




select from should be narrowed down to only that respective service.129  Second, after the 
author selects a certain battle, the default “Date you arrived / departed the battle” should 
be the actual dates pertaining to the battle in order to ease the author’s requirements. For 
example, after a user selects the Second Battle of Fallujah, when the user clicks on “Date 
you arrived at the battle,” the calendar should be set to November 5, 2004 instead of the 
current date; this makes is simpler for the user to choose the date. Third, the author 
should have the ability to edit a story after submission. Fourth, there should be required 
fields to fill out, so unless those certain fields are entered, the application will not allow 
the narrative to be submitted. Fifth, after the author selects a certain battle, the map 
should zoom into that region of the world so the user can select the first event more 
quickly. 
6. Validation Mode Change 
Validation Mode 1 and Validation Mode 2 conduct the analysis down to the 
battalion level. In order to achieve a more refined analysis, the application could be 
improved by conducting the analysis down to the company level. If the battalion level 
analysis is an accurate representation of the historical maps, the application could be used 
to separate the battalion size analysis down to a company level in order to illustrate an in-
depth graphic depiction of the battle, which could be used as an historical resource.    
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR PHASE TWO / IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The Combat Stories application is currently ready for the second phase. There are 
three main goals to this phase: gathering actual narratives from the second battle of 
Fallujah, using the Combat Stories application, and then conducting the analysis of the 
narratives. In order to gather actual narratives, it is recommended a few different venues 
with specific dates and locations be arranged.130  The venues should be concentrated on 
                                                 
129 If the application has the DOD CAC recommendation implemented as previously described, then 
certain information can be automatically filled in, such as an active duty member’s service and unit. 
130 A recommended way to broadcast information about the venues is to set up a website explaining 
the goal of the application testing, and then advertise that site through media sources such as the Army, 
Navy, and Marine Corps Times and the Army and Marine Corps Facebook websites. 
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the home stations of the ground units involved in the assault operations.131 The venues 
will require computers with Internet access. Every attempt should be made to identify the 
individuals participating in the narrative collection ahead of time so Naval Postgraduate 
School’s ESRI site manager can create usernames and passwords. 
The venues should include the physical presence of an individual knowledgeable 
on the application, such as a future thesis student. While the application is designed to be 
intuitive, the thesis student will be accessible to users in order to answer questions about 
how to make a story map and to record any issues with the application identified by the 
users. 
Once the narratives have been collected, analysis can be conducted. As 
demonstrated in the first phase with constructed stories, the individual narratives 
accurately portrayed the historical maps’ illustrations, which in turn validated the 
importance of service member storytelling. During the second phase, if the real narratives 
compare accurately with the historical maps, this capstone project will confirm the 
validation of the storytelling method.   
                                                 
131 Refer to footnote 104 in Chapter 2 for a list of the ground units involved in the assault. One 
recommended venue should be 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, CA. Not only was 1st Marine 
Division responsible for the ground units involved in the battle, but on November 7, 2014, 1st Marine 
Division held a ceremony to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the second battle of Fallujah. Jennifer 
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